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What is This?
Ingroup Glorification, Moral Disengagement, and Justice in the Context of Collective Violence

Bernhard Leidner¹, Emanuele Castano¹, Erica Zaiser², and Roger Giner-Sorolla²

Abstract
What aspects of ingroup identification can lead people to resist justice for the victims of their ingroup’s mistreatment? In three studies carried out in the United States and United Kingdom, in which participants read reports of mistreatment of prisoners and civilians by coalition troops in the Iraq war, ingroup glorification, but not ingroup attachment or other individual-difference variables, was a key predictor of lesser demands for justice, but only when the perpetrators belonged to the ingroup. This effect of glorification was mediated by two moral disengagement mechanisms focusing on the outgroup: minimization of the emotional suffering of the victims’ families and explicit dehumanization of the victim group. These findings further reinforce the difference between glorification and other forms of ingroup identification, demonstrating that glorification is problematic in maintaining and fostering intergroup relations because of its connection to moral disengagement.

Keywords
moral disengagement, ingroup identification, justice, collective violence, intergroup relations

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Since the Nuremberg trials following the Second World War, we have witnessed an evolution in the ways in which people and institutions are held accountable for crimes against humanity. Developments in international law, as well as the increased availability of images and information, have led the international community to demand greater responsibility for acts of cruelty committed on a national level (Castano, 2008). Following the Nuremberg precedent, numerous state leaders have been brought to trial—whether the crimes were committed recently, as in the trial of Slobodan Milosevic for crimes during conflicts in the Balkans in the 1990s, or decades earlier, as in the trial of Augusto Pinochet for crimes during his dictatorship in the 1970s. Legal proceedings have also targeted individuals lower in the hierarchy of the perpetrating system, such as members of Nazi Einsatzgruppen death squads, or members of the Scorpions, a Serb paramilitary unit responsible for massacres in the Bosnian and Kosovo wars. Although justice is sometimes administered by groups that do not share a national identity with the perpetrators (e.g., the Einsatzgruppen trials conducted by U.S. military courts), it is increasingly often within the national group that it is pursued (e.g., the 2004-2005 courts-martial of U.S. soldiers who mistreated prisoners at Abu Ghraib in Iraq).

Often, a critical factor in deciding whether perpetrators will be brought to justice by bodies within their national group is the strength of demands for justice among their ingroup. When pressured by the international community to pursue justice, political leaders may feel constrained by internal public sympathy for the perpetrators because they are fellow nationals. These constraints can reduce willingness to pursue both retributive justice (i.e., punishment of perpetrators) and restorative justice (i.e., apologies or reparations to victims of the wrongdoings, their family members, institutions, or foreign governments). For example, in 2002 the United States formally withdrew from the Rome Treaty establishing the International Criminal Court, partly out of concern that it could be used to prosecute U.S. leaders and troops. Therefore, understanding the psychological precursors and barriers to public demands for justice is important in the aftermath of domestic and...
international conflicts. In this research, we investigate the role played by social identification and moral disengagement strategies in reducing demands for intergroup justice.

**Social Identifications: Attachment Versus Glorification**

Past research has treated social identification as a unidimensional construct, typically measured with a single scale (e.g., Bluc, McGarty, Reynolds, & Muntele, 2007; Doosje, Ellemers, & Spears, 1995). More recent research has found this unidimensional approach to be conceptually and empirically insufficient (for reviews, see Ashmore, Deaux, & McLaughlin-Volpe, 2004; Leach et al., 2008; Lickel, Schmader, & Spanovic, 2007; Roccas, Sagiv, Schwartz, Halevy, & Eidelson, 2008; Sellers, Smith, Shelton, Rowley, & Chavous, 1998). The more recent multidimensional approach parallels long-standing distinctions that scholars studying national identification have drawn between pseudopatriotism and genuine patriotism (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950), nationalism and patriotism (Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989), and blind, constructive, and conventional patriotism (Staub, 1997).

Roccas, Klar, and Liviatan (2006), in their studies of reactions to ingroup wrongdoings, proposed a bidimensional view of identification with one’s nation, distinguishing between attachment and glorification. Attachment refers to subjective identification of one’s self with the essence and common fate of a group, whereas glorification refers to the belief that one’s group is superior to outgroups on a variety of dimensions. This includes beliefs in superior ingroup morality, a dimension shown to be the most important in determining ingroup attitudes (Leach, Ellemers, & Barreto, 2007). The main difference between glorification and attachment is that glorification has a comparative component, focusing on the superiority of the ingroup over other groups, and emphasizes loyalty and obedience to the ingroup, whereas attachment is lacking such a comparative component, being entirely ingroup focused and allowing for a more critical evaluation of the ingroup and its actions (cf. Brewer, 2001).

Beliefs in the superiority and impeccability of the ingroup could easily lead people to see less injustice in ingroup wrongdoings (e.g., oppression, violence). Also, as glorification is concerned with preserving the image of the (allegedly superior) ingroup, threats to such an inflated image are likely to result in the deployment of defensive strategies. Therefore, high glorifiers likely see less need for reestablishing justice and respond to their own group’s atrocities by subjectively diminishing the impact of the ingroup’s actions and by derogating the victims.

Roccas et al. (2006) have already shown that ingroup attachment and glorification have opposing relations to important social psychological variables. In an Israeli sample confronted with violent actions committed by Israelis against Palestinians, these authors found that glorification negatively predicted collective guilt and positively predicted exonerating cognitions (e.g., thinking the accounts too harsh, blaming the Palestinians themselves). Attachment, on the other hand, had opposite effects. In line with these findings, we hypothesize that ingroup glorification, but not attachment, will be negatively related to demands for justice (i.e., punishment of perpetrators, compensation of victims) among members of the perpetrator group. Moreover, glorification should accompany defensive moral disengagement from the ingroup’s reprehensible behavior.

**Moral Disengagement**

Moral disengagement strategies are psychological processes that help people construe a version of reality in which their own actions are not reprehensible and therefore do not lead to self-sanctions (Bandura, 1990, 1999). Moral disengagement can take a number of forms. Our research focused on two types of disengagement that specifically involve perceptions of the outgroup: diminishing the victims’ psychological reality of pain and suffering (emotional minimization) and considering the victims as less than human (dehumanization), which in turn result in their exclusion from the scope of justice (Bar-Tal, 1990; Kelman, 1973; Opotow, 1990; Staub, 1987, 1990).

The defense of ingroup identity through moral disengagement can also reduce cognitive dissonance (Brehm, 1956; Festinger, 1957) between prescriptive moral norms (i.e., personally held moral values) and descriptive moral norms reflected in the ingroup’s behavior (i.e., intragroup dissonance; Glasford, Dovidio, & Pratto, 2009). As a consequence, again, the demand for justice to be reestablished might be reduced. Specifically, after moral disengagement, people might support less punishment of ingroup perpetrators and fewer reparations for outgroup victims. Consider this anecdote, reported by Marcu, Lyons, and Heggies (2007): “In 2003, a Hungarian judge decided that two [Gypsy] men wrongly accused of murder should receive less compensation than they had demanded in their wrongful-arrest suit” because, the judge argued, these men “had ‘more primitive personalities than the average; therefore, the psychological damage they suffered was not so serious that it would justify the compensation they requested’” (p. 875). This case stands as a stark example of how the dehumanization of victims and the minimization of their suffering (Bandura, 1999) may impede ingroup demands for justice in response to ingroup-committed wrongdoings.

**Glorification, Moral Disengagement, and Justice**

We have outlined our rationale for expecting glorification, but not attachment, to be negatively related to demands for justice against fellow ingroup perpetrators (i.e., punishment) and for outgroup victims (i.e., compensation). We further expect this effect to be mediated by increased moral disengagement among high glorifiers. Acknowledging that ingroup-committed atrocities are unjust threatens the glorifier’s belief that the
ingroup is superior, particularly in terms of morality, to other groups. This threat to the identity of ingroup glorifiers is dealt with by the psychological defense of moral disengagement, which in turn results in lower demands for justice.

Because social identification is the cornerstone of this process of appraising justice, we expect ingroup glorification to reduce justice demands via moral disengagement only when moral aspects of one’s own group superiority are threatened, as is the case when one’s ingroup committed an atrocity against another group. We do not expect this process to occur when injustice is perpetrated by a group other than one’s own group. As Leyens et al. (2000) have shown, a subtle form of dehumanization, called infrahumanization, is a fairly ubiquitous component of the perception of outgroups. However, infrahumanization can also become enhanced and take on the function of moral disengagement in specific situations, such as when the ingroup intends future violence against an outgroup (e.g., the dehumanization of Jews by Nazi propaganda before the Holocaust) or seeks to justify its past violence against them (Castano & Giner-Sorolla, 2006). Therefore, we expect mechanisms such as emotional minimization and dehumanization to be present in the context of both ingroup- and outgroup-committed atrocities. Only in the case of ingroup-committed atrocities, however, should these mechanisms take on a moral disengagement function, because only then is the moral character of the ingroup at stake. In other words, it is not merely threats to psychological equanimity due to human suffering in general, or empathic feelings for the victims, that can account for our proposed effects of moral threat on justice seeking.

Whereas ingroup glorification is expected to moderate moral disengagement and ultimately justice because of identity concerns, ingroup attachment should not have the same effects. Because ingroup attachment does not assume ingroup superiority and allows for constructive criticism of the ingroup, highly attached people are not as threatened by ingroup misdeeds as high glorifiers. Therefore, even though attachment might show a zero-order positive relation to psychological defenses in response to ingroup-committed atrocities, when controlling for glorification this relation should disappear or even become negative. Likewise, attachment should not accompany reduced demands for justice, when controlling for glorification; if anything, attachment should affect demands for justice positively.

In the following studies we tested the effect of ingroup glorification on justice demands, as well as the mediating role of two outgroup-focused moral disengagement strategies: dehumanization and emotional minimization, and the outcome variable demands for justice for the victims and perpetrators. To maximize the psychological realism and relevance of the study, the context for our U.S. participants was the recent Iraq war, with descriptions of human rights violations committed either by U.S. (ingroup) or Iraqi (outgroup) soldiers. This manipulation aimed to show that the hypothesized process of dealing with ingroup wrongdoing does not emerge when wrongdoings are committed by an outgroup against another group. Mechanisms such as dehumanization and emotional minimization may also occur in response to outgroup wrongdoings. However, in that context they should not reduce the demand for justice but rather may be explained as a consequence of the mere threat human suffering poses to psychological equanimity.

**Method**

**Participants.** The sample consisted of 308 participants born in the United States who were recruited through the Internet website Craigslist.com. Although online samples are less controlled than offline samples, recent research did not find significant differences when comparing online and offline samples in the same studies or across different studies (e.g., Riva, Teruzzi, & Anolli, 2003); furthermore, compared to offline samples, online samples tend to be more representative of the population in terms of demographics such as gender, socioeconomic status, and age, and they do not suffer from nonserious or repeated responders (Gosling, Vazire, Srivastava, & John, 2004). After excluding 1 participant who proved to be a univariate outlier on the emotional minimization measure and 1 participant on the justice measure, 306 participants were retained for data analysis (174 female, 122 male, 10 who did not indicate gender; age $M = 40.73$, $SD = 14.94$, range $= 18-82$). There were no multivariate outliers in any of the following analyses.

**Procedure.** The experiment was conducted online. After giving consent, participants read a newspaper article depicting four alleged cases of coalition military personnel torturing and killing Iraqi civilians in a prison near Baghdad. Although names were changed, the cases were based on confirmed cases of abuse committed by U.S. military personnel in Iraq. The reported mistreatments of prisoners included water torture, beatings, stress positions, and humiliating acts. In all four cases, mistreatment and torture eventually led to the deaths of the prisoners. In the ingroup-perpetrator condition, the perpetrators were described as U.S. soldiers, whereas in the outgroup-perpetrator condition, the perpetrators were described as Iraqi soldiers; otherwise, the text remained identical across conditions. After reading the article, participants completed several dependent measures in the order described later. For all measures, participants answered on a visual analogue scale with different endpoints depending on the question, as detailed later. No values appeared on the scale, but the program recorded answers on a continuum from 1 to X, with X equaling 5, 7, or 9, depending on the measure.
Emotional minimization. Participants were presented with 13 negative emotion terms in alphabetical order: anguish, disgust, dismay, fear, fright, humiliation, melancholy, pain, panic, resentment, shame, sorrow, suffering. For each emotion participants answered “to what extent do you think that the dead prisoners’ family members felt this emotion when they were informed about the deaths” on a continuum ranging from 1 (not at all) to 5 (very much). This measure was intended to capture minimization of emotions. After reversing the items, high scores indicate a high degree of minimization of the emotional suffering of the victims’ family members.

Explicit dehumanization. Explicit dehumanization was measured with 10 items (e.g. “Compared to other populations, Iraqis are . . .”) with responses ranging from less civilized to more civilized [reverse coded]; “It is very easy to endorse the values of Iraqis” [reverse coded]; “Some aspects of Iraqi life are typical of a backward culture”; “Compared to Westerners, moral values are less likely to be developed among Iraqis”). Participants indicated their response on a continuum from 1 (totally disagree) to 7 (totally agree).

Justice. Justice was measured with seven items, three items tapping retributive aspects (“Independently from any other kind of punishment, these U.S./Iraqi soldiers should be fired by the army”; “Should the death penalty be considered for these U.S./Iraqi soldiers?”) with responses ranging from no, absolutely not to yes, absolutely; “For how long should these U.S./Iraqi soldiers be in jail?” with responses ranging from minimum by law to maximum by law) and four items tapping restorative aspects (e.g., “The families of the victims should receive financial compensation”; “The families of the victims should receive an apology by the U.S./Iraqi soldiers involved in the death of their family members”; “The families of the victims should receive an apology by the U.S./Iraqi government”; responses ranging from no, absolutely not to yes, absolutely). All responses were given on a continuum ranging from 1 (no, absolutely not) to 7 (yes, absolutely).

National attachment and glorification. National attachment (e.g., “It is important to me to contribute to my nation”) and glorification (e.g., “The U.S. is better than other nations in all respects”) were measured using the scales by Roccas et al. (2006), adapted to refer to the American identity. The responses were given on a continuum ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).

Results

We first checked for reliability of the glorification and attachment scales. Both attachment (Cronbach’s α = .94, M = 5.25, SD = 1.40) and glorification (Cronbach’s α = .88, M = 3.97, SD = 1.32) proved reliable. Furthermore, neither attachment, F(1, 301) < 1.37, p > .10, η² = .00, nor glorification, F(1, 298) < 0.12, p > .10, η² = .00, were affected by the manipulation, thus allowing us to use them, together with the experimental manipulation (ingroup-perpetrator vs. outgroup-perpetrator), as independent variables (IVs) in a general linear model (GLM) procedure in SAS 9.2. Therefore, attachment and glorification were standardized (Aiken & West, 1991; Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003). The GLM procedure outputs F values instead of t values, but it is equivalent to using a regression procedure with effect codings of the dichotomous variable(s). In the following, Fs are reported. The degrees of freedom vary slightly from analysis to analysis because of different numbers of missing values between dependent variables.

Justice. The seven justice items showed good internal consistency and were thus averaged into a composite score (Cronbach’s α = .85, M = 5.25, SD = 1.32). On this score, using the GLM described earlier, significant main effects of condition, F(1, 294) = 46.81, p < .001, η² = .14; glorification, F(1, 294) = 12.71, p < .001, η² = .04; and attachment, F(1, 294) = 4.25, p < .05, η² = .01, emerged. Participants in the ingroup-perpetrator condition (M = 4.76) showed a weaker demand for justice than participants in the outgroup-perpetrator condition (M = 5.70). Attachment was positively associated with justice, β = .14, t(294) = 2.06, p < .05, whereas glorification was negatively associated with justice, β = −.25, t(294) = −3.56, p < .001. Most importantly, as expected, the interaction between condition and glorification was significant, F(1, 294) = 5.77, p < .05, η² = .02 (see Figure 1). Demands for justice in the two conditions differed among low glorifiers (1 SD below the mean), t(294) = −2.14, p < .05, as well as among high glorifiers (1 SD above the mean), t(294) = −6.26, p < .001, with lower demands for justice in the ingroup-perpetrator as compared to the outgroup-perpetrator condition (Ms = 5.32 and 5.81 for low glorifiers, and Ms = 4.20 and 5.60 for high glorifiers), but this effect was much stronger among high glorifiers than among low glorifiers. Looking at the same result from a different angle, glorification did not predict justice in the outgroup-perpetrator condition, β = −.08, t(294) = −0.89, p > .10, but it did so in the ingroup-perpetrator condition, β = −.42, t(294) = −3.94, p < .001. The two-way interaction of condition and attachment and the three-way interaction of condition, attachment and glorification were not significant, Fs < 1, ps > .05.

Emotional minimization. A composite score of the 13 (reversed) emotions participants attributed to the dead prisoners’ family members was computed. This score (Cronbach’s α = .91, M = 1.94, SD = 0.58) was then used as a dependent variable in the GLM described earlier, revealing significant main effects of glorification, F(1, 284) = 7.83, p < .01, η² = .03, and attachment, F(1, 284) = 5.37, p < .05. Whereas glorification led to a greater degree of emotional minimization, β = .22, t(284) = 2.80, p < .01, attachment led to a lesser degree of emotional minimization β = −.18, t(284) = −2.32, p < .05. All other effects were not significant, Fs(1, 284) < 2.30, ps > .10.

Explicit dehumanization. After excluding two items because of low item–total correlations, the remaining eight items tapping explicit dehumanization were averaged into a composite score (Cronbach’s α = .87, M = 4.28, SD = 1.21). The same analytical strategy as for emotional minimization again revealed
a significant main effect of glorification, which was positively associated with explicit dehumanization of the victim group, $F(1, 294) = 82.78, p < .001, \eta^2 = .22, \beta = .58$. All other effects were nonsignificant, $F_{1}(1, 294) < 1.50, ps > .10$.

As expected, there were no effects of condition on minimization or dehumanization, and attachment had, if anything, a diminishing rather than facilitating effect on these strategies controlling for glorification. Because attachment had no interactive effects on any of the preceding variables, we excluded the interactions involving attachment from the following mediational analyses that explain the link between glorification and justice we observed in the ingroup-perpetrator (but not in the outgroup-perpetrator) condition.

**The meditational process.** As reported earlier, glorification predicted justice in the ingroup-perpetrator condition but not in the outgroup-perpetrator condition. Thus, mediation was assessed only in the ingroup-perpetrator condition. A multiple mediation model derived from our theory was thus tested via bootstrapping (Preacher & Hayes, 2004, 2008), generating 95% bias-corrected and accelerated bootstrap confidence intervals for the indirect effects using 10,000 bootstrap samples. Attachment was also included as a covariate.

In this model, the indirect effect of glorification on justice was significant (with a confidence interval not including zero), indicating multiple mediation between glorification and demands for justice. The model, with single-path coefficients, is depicted in Figure 2, and the bivariate correlations are reported in Table 1. As expected, in the model, glorification positively predicted emotional minimization and explicit dehumanization. Both the minimization strategy and the dehumanization strategy affected justice negatively. Although the total (zero-order) effect of glorification on justice was significant, once the mediators were included, the direct effect was not significant. Attachment, in line with our expectations, had no effect on justice ($\beta = .04, t = .46, p > .05$). Overall, this model explained 41% of the variance in justice, confirming our mediational hypothesis.

**Discussion**

Study 1 supported our hypotheses. In the ingroup-perpetrator condition, the multiple mediation analyses indicated that the negative effect of glorification on justice was mediated by moral disengagement strategies. This pattern supports our claim that emotional minimization and explicit dehumanization can function as moral disengagement strategies when confronted with ingroup transgressions, affecting behavioral intentions such as demands for justice. In addition to providing support for the hypothesized process, results also confirmed that, controlling for glorification, attachment to the ingroup does not enhance moral disengagement strategies or lessen demands for justice. If anything, and consistent with what was found by Roccas et al. (2006), attachment showed an opposite effect to that of glorification on one of the moral disengagement strategies, minimization.

The shift from unidimensional measures of social identification to multidimensional measures such as glorification versus attachment is certainly a conceptual and empirical advancement. Given the relative recency of the glorification and attachment constructs and scales, it would be of interest to assess whether their contribution to the processes described previously is unique or whether it is due to shared variance with other, related constructs—a question not yet tested in published research.

One personality construct that has common but also distinct features with glorification is social dominance orientation (SDO; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994). SDO refers to a person’s tendency to be in favor of group-based hierarchies and domination of some groups, considered superior, over other groups, considered inferior (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Therefore, SDO is related to the degree with which people categorize groups on domains of status and power, and with which they favor social inequality. Without distinguishing different aspects of identification, SDO has been found to correlate positively with national identification (Pratto, Stallworth, & Conway-Lanz, 1998). We share the assumption made by Roccas et al. (2008) that this relation stems mainly from the superiority aspect of glorification. SDO, however, is about intergroup hierarchies in general and only indirectly entails the conviction that one’s ingroup is superior in both power and morality to other groups, whereas glorification builds on this superiority assumption, specifically comparing the ingroup versus outgroups as one of its cornerstones. Moreover, glorification includes the facet of loyalty and obedience to the ingroup as its second main component, whereas SDO does not.

Findings in two surveys of American students reported by Roccas et al. (2008) support our reasoning. In these surveys, SDO correlated most strongly with “superiority identification” (a construct similar to the superiority aspect of glorification) rather than, for instance, “deference identification.” These and similar findings (Roccas et al., 2008) suggest that SDO may overlap with part of the glorification scale but is unlikely to replace glorification as a whole. We thus predict that, in

![Figure 1. Study 1: Effect of identity of perpetrator by glorification on justice](Image 72x579 to 293x711)
addition to their shared variance, SDO and glorification will have some unique variance because of the differences in their conception and operationalization. The question is thus whether the moderating role of glorification on justice that emerged in Study 1 holds when controlling for SDO.

Study 2

This study was conducted to replicate the findings of Study 1 and to further assess the specific role of glorification. Furthermore, Study 2 makes two methodological improvements on Study 1. First, attachment and glorification were measured at the end of Study 1 because we did not want to suggest to participants that the study had anything to do with national identification before they read the article and completed the other measures. Despite attachment and glorification being measured at the end of the study, using them as moderators of the effect of the manipulation was justified because the manipulation had no effect on either. Nonetheless, given our mediational model, it would be more desirable to measure them first, before the manipulation and other variables. Second, in the outgroup-perpetrator condition of Study 1, the social identity of the perpetrators (Iraqis) overlapped with that of the victims, who were likely to be thought of as Iraqis, Middle Easterners, or Arabs. Therefore, in Study 2, we chose an English-speaking “ally” group, Australians, as the outgroup perpetrators, making an even stronger test of our hypotheses about differential ingroup versus outgroup effects.

Method

Participants. The sample consisted of 177 participants, recruited through the Study Response Project (Stanton, 2006; Wallace, 2004). After eliminating 18 people who were not born in the United States, 10 people who did not correctly remember the identity of the perpetrating group, and 1 univariate outlier on the justice measure, 148 participants (103 female, 43 male, 2 did not indicate their gender; age $M = 33.27$, $SD = 12.34$, range = 18-65) were retained for subsequent analyses.

Materials and procedure. The experiment was conducted online. After giving consent and filling out the measures for attachment ($\alpha = .91$, $M = 5.94$, $SD = 1.71$), glorification ($\alpha = .86$, 

![Figure 2. Multiple mediation model of the ingroup condition in Study 1 ($N = 141$)](image-url)
M = 4.10, SD = 1.62), and SDO, assessed via the SDO$_6$ scale (Pratto et al., 1994; Sidanius, Levin, Liu, & Pratto, 2000; α = .90, M = 2.70, SD = 1.25), participants read a newspaper article nearly identical to that used in Study 1, apart from the outgroup perpetrators being Australian. Then participants answered the same emotional minimization (Cronbach’s α = .88, M = 2.56, SD = 1.05) and explicit dehumanization (Cronbach’s α = .82, M = 4.50, SD = 1.43) scales as in Study 1. In the justice scale (Cronbach’s α = .77, M = 7.03, SD = 1.45), one of the seven items (tapping capital punishment) was eliminated because of an item–total correlation less than .40. All items were answered on a visual analog scale with endpoints of 1 and 9.

Results

The same analytical approach used in Study 1 was adopted here, with the addition, in the GLM analyses, of SDO and the interaction between condition and SDO.

Justice. Justice was significantly affected by the manipulation, $F(1, 139) = 15.52, p < .01, \eta^2 = .10$, with participants in the ingroup-perpetrator condition demanding significantly less justice ($M = 6.63$) than participants in the outgroup-perpetrator condition ($M = 7.51$). As in Study 1, this effect was qualified by the expected significant interaction between manipulation and glorification, $F(1, 139) = 4.46, p < .05, \eta^2 = .03$ (see Figure 3), which mirrors that found in Study 1, even having controlled for SDO and its interaction with condition. Whereas low glorifiers did not significantly differ in their demands for justice depending on condition, $t = -0.53, p > .10$ (M$_{S}$ = 7.22 and 7.41 in the ingroup- and outgroup-perpetrator conditions, respectively), high glorifiers demanded significantly less justice when the perpetrators belonged to their ingroup ($M = 6.15$) than when they belonged to another group ($M = 7.58$), $t = -3.97, p < .01$. Looking at this interaction from another angle, glorification did not predict justice in the outgroup-perpetrator condition, $t = 0.39, p > .10$, but did so in the ingroup-perpetrator condition, $t(139) = -2.68, \beta = -.53, p < .01$. The main effect of SDO was also significant, indicating that demands for justice decreased with increasing SDO, $F(1, 139) = 19.70, p < .001, \eta^2 = .12, \beta = -.49$. The main effect of glorification was in the same direction as in Study 1, with justice demands decreasing with increasing glorification, but only trending toward significance, $F(1, 139) = 3.20, p = .12, \eta^2 = .01, \beta = -.23$. All other effects were nonsignificant, $F$s$(1, 139) < 2.00, ps > .15$.

Emotional minimization. SDO was also a significant covariate predicting emotional minimization, $F(1, 128) = 14.14, p < .001, \eta^2 = .10$. Greater SDO led to greater minimization of the emotions of the victims’ family members, $\beta = -.34$. The main effect of glorification, again controlling for SDO and its interaction with condition, was in the same direction as in Study 1, but did not reach significance, $F(1, 128) = 1.06, p > .10, \eta^2 = .01, \beta = -.13$. All other effects were not significant, $F$s$(1, 128) < 1.20, ps > .10$. As in Study 1, the nonsignificant main effect of condition indicates that people minimized the emotions of the victims’ family members to the same extent in both conditions, even if it should only serve as a moral disengagement strategy in the ingroup-perpetrator condition.

Explicit dehumanization. The main effect of glorification emerged, $F(1, 140) = 10.09, p < .01, \eta^2 = .07$, showing that explicit dehumanization increased with increasing levels of glorification, $\beta = .46$. No interaction between glorification and condition emerged, $F(1, 140) = 0.37, p > .10$, and the main effect of condition was not significant, $F(1, 140) = 1.52, p > .10$, which was in line with the hypothesis that some dehumanization arises even when the perpetrator is an outgroup. The main effect of SDO was significant, $F(1, 140) = 8.76, p < .01, \eta^2 = .06$, with greater SDO predicting greater explicit dehumanization, $\beta = .32$. However, it should be noted that glorification still accounted for dehumanization, even taking into account this effect of SDO. As in the preceding analyses of justice and minimization, attachment, did not have any significant main or interaction effect, $F$s$(1, 140) < 2.00, ps > .10$.

The meditational process. As in Study 1, while no effect of glorification on justice appeared in the outgroup condition, this effect was significant in the ingroup condition (see Table 2 for bivariate correlations). We thus tested a multiple mediation model to assess whether moral disengagement strategies mediated this effect. As in Study 1, this model revealed a significant indirect effect; the multiple mediation model is depicted in Figure 4. Looking at the components of these paths, glorification affected dehumanization significantly, but despite a positive relationship of moderate degree, its effect on minimization did not reach significance, possibly due to the relatively smaller sample ($N = 74$) compared to Study 1. Minimization predicted justice significantly negatively, whereas dehumanization’s negative effect on justice did not reach significance, again despite a substantial strength of relationship and therefore

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<td>2. Glorification</td>
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<td>3. SDO</td>
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<td>4. Emotional minimization</td>
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<td>5. Dehumanization</td>
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<td>6. Justice</td>
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Correlations within the ingroup condition are reported above the diagonal; correlations within the outgroup condition are reported below the diagonal. SDO = social dominance orientation. The numbers below the correlation coefficients indicate the sample size of each pairwise correlation. *p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01. †p < .001.
possibly due to the small sample size. The total (zero-order) effect of glorification on justice was significant, whereas the direct effect, including the mediators in the model, was not. The effect of attachment on justice was not significant ($\beta = -0.09$, $t = -0.40$, $p > .05$). This model explained 46% of the variance in justice.

The significance of the indirect effect and the nonsignificance of the direct effect are consistent with the mediation hypothesis, and in line with what we observed in Study 1. Two of the paths did not reach significance, but their strength was similar to what was observed in Study 1; thus, sample size might be responsible for this partial discrepancy. We therefore tested the multiple mediation model with the samples of Study 1 and Study 2 combined. With this larger sample all predicted relations between variables were significant and in the expected directions, and the indirect effect of glorification on justice was significant. Also as expected, the direct effect
of glorification on justice and the effect of attachment on justice (β = .01, t = 0.20, p > .10) were not significant. This model explained 46% of the variance in justice (see Figure 5).

**Discussion**

Study 2 yielded further evidence for the main hypothesis of interest, that is, the moderating role of ingroup glorification, but not attachment, on demands for justice in the context of ingroup wrongdoings. Furthermore, it also replicated the mediating role of moral disengagement strategies on this relation. Therefore, Study 2 replicated the findings from Study 1 while addressing its shortcomings. First, attachment and glorification were measured before the manipulation. Second, the moderating role of glorification on the effect of condition (ingroup- vs. outgroup-perpetrator) on justice demands remained after controlling for SDO. Third, the social identities of perpetrators and victims in the outgroup-perpetrator condition were not overlapping, and the results were found even when the outgroup was more similar to the ingroup in terms of its place in the international community, an ally of the ingroup in the conflict at hand.

**Study 3**

This study sought to replicate the most important findings from the ingroup conditions of Study 1 and Study 2 while using a different participant population involved in the issue of Iraq war atrocities. Specifically, British participants were recruited and presented with reports of army atrocities similar to the U.S.-based reports in the previous studies. To focus on the mediational process in a larger sample, only the ingroup-perpetrator condition was included.

In Study 3, we also aimed at further establishing the role of ingroup glorification. Having tested SDO, which is similar to the superiority aspect of glorification, in Study 2, we now wanted to test that aspect of right-wing authoritarianism (RWA; Altemeyer, 1981, 1998) that is most similar to the loyalty and obedience aspect of glorification: authoritarian submission (AS). In fact, in the previously mentioned surveys of American students reported in Roccas et al. (2008), RWA as a whole correlated most strongly with “deference identification” (loyalty and obedience aspect of glorification) rather than other forms of identification such as “superiority identification,” suggesting that AS is a good representative of RWA in terms of loyalty and obedience. RWA has been repeatedly shown to correlate with prejudice, discrimination, and intolerance (Adorno et al., 1950; Altemeyer, 1981, 1998). Not surprisingly in light of the commonalities with glorification and its “siblings” (e.g., nationalism), RWA was also found to correlate positively with nationalism but not with patriotism (Baughn & Yaprak, 1996), a finding replicated across different measures of authoritarianism and identification (Blank, 2003; Burris, Branscombe, & Jackson, 2000; Duckitt, Wagner, du Plessis, & Birum, 2002). We believe, however, that glorification goes beyond RWA, for RWA does not include the perceived superiority of one’s ingroup over other groups, a key feature of glorification. In line with this theoretical notion, Roccas et al. (2008) report a study that showed that deference explained...
people’s intolerance toward conscientious objectors to military service in Israel, and it did so beyond the explanation of RWA. These findings suggest that RWA, despite its likely overlap with glorification, is unlikely to replace glorification.

**Method**

**Participants.** A total of 121 British citizens completed the survey (32 male, 89 female; age $M = 21.11, SD = 7.49$, range $= 18–68$). They were recruited through the research participation system at the University of Kent and were offered partial course credit for completing the experiment.

**Materials and procedure.** The study was conducted online. After giving consent, participants were asked to confirm that they were British citizens. As in Study 2, attachment (Cronbach’s $\alpha = .91$, $M = 4.23$, $SD = 1.19$) and glorification (Cronbach’s $\alpha = .86$, $M = 3.42$, $SD = 0.99$) were then measured before the manipulation, as was AS (Cronbach’s $\alpha = .81$, $M = 3.59$, $SD = 0.75$; Duckitt, Bizumic, Krauss, & Heled, in press).

Participants then took part in a self-reflection task and a cognitive estimation filler task that were theoretically unrelated to the questions being studied. These tasks separated the identification questions from the main study, making the connection less obvious. Next, participants were then asked to read a newspaper article describing British military personnel torturing and killing Iraqi civilians near Basra, which was based on actual incidents involving the British military, similar to the article used in Study 1 and Study 2 based on U.S. incidents. After participants read the article, the mediators and outcome variables were measured, using the same scales as in Study 2, altered to fit the British context: emotional minimization (Cronbach’s $\alpha = .87$, $M = 1.76$, $SD = 0.62$), explicit dehumanization (Cronbach’s $\alpha = .81$, $M = 3.67$, $SD = 0.85$), and justice (Cronbach’s $\alpha = .80$, $M = 5.29$, $SD = 1.18$), from which one of the seven items was eliminated because of an item–total correlation less than .40. All items were assessed on scales ranging from 1 to 7.

**Results**

**Justice.** The justice score was entered as the dependent variable in a GLM with (standardized) attachment glorification and AS. The main effect of glorification was marginally significant, $F(1, 117) = 3.48, p = .064, \eta^2 = .03$, and it affected justice negatively, $\beta = -0.27$. Attachment and AS were not significant, $F$s($1, 116) < 1.6, ps > .20.

**Emotional minimization.** One multivariate outlier was found and removed from subsequent analysis. The same analytic model was used but with emotional minimization as the dependent variable. Glorification had a significant effect, $F(1, 116) = 4.45, p = .037, \eta^2 = .04$, and positively predicted emotional minimization, $\beta = 0.31$. AS also positively predicted minimization, $\beta = 0.21, F(1, 116) = 4.42, p = .038, \eta^2 = .04$. Attachment was significant, $F(1, 116) = 8.12, p < .01, \eta^2 = .07$, affecting emotional minimization negatively, $\beta = -0.37$.

**Explicit dehumanization.** Here, too, one multivariate outlier was found and removed from subsequent analysis. The only significant main effect was glorification, $F(1, 116) = 5.84, p = .017, \eta^2 = .05$, which positively predicted explicit dehumanization, $\beta = 0.37$. All other effects were nonsignificant, $F$s($1, 116) < .70, ps > .10.

**The meditational process.** As in Studies 1 and 2, a multiple mediation model (see Figure 6) tested the role of our two moral disengagement strategies (emotional minimization and
Table 3. Correlations, Study 3

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<th>1</th>
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<th>3</th>
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<tr>
<td>1. Attachment</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Glorification</td>
<td>0.75***</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>3. AS</td>
<td>0.28**</td>
<td>0.50***</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Emotional minimization</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
<td>0.130</td>
<td>0.26***</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Dehumanization</td>
<td>0.23*</td>
<td>0.35***</td>
<td>0.24***</td>
<td>0.17†</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Justice</td>
<td>-0.154†</td>
<td>-0.27**</td>
<td>-0.24**</td>
<td>-0.36***</td>
<td>-0.36***</td>
<td>1</td>
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</tbody>
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AS = authoritarian submission. The numbers below the correlation coefficients indicate the sample size of each pairwise correlation. \( \hat{p} <.10 \), *\( p <.05 \), **\( p <.01 \), ***\( p <.001 \).

explicit dehumanization) as mediators of the relation between glorification and justice via bootstrapping. Again, attachment was included as a covariate.

As in Study 1, the indirect effect of glorification on justice was significant (confidence interval not including zero).\(^3\) The model, with single path coefficients, is depicted in Figure 6, and the bivariate correlations are reported in Table 3. Again, as in Study 1 and as predicted, glorification positively predicted emotional minimization and explicit dehumanization. Minimization and dehumanization negatively affected justice. The total (zero-order) effect of glorification on justice was significant, but once the mediators were included in the model, the direct effect was no longer significant. Attachment, in line with our expectations, had no effect on justice (\( \beta =.01 \), \( t =.041 \), \( p >.95 \)). Overall, this model explained 26% of the variance in justice and confirmed our mediational hypothesis.

General Discussion

Over the past two decades there has been an increased willingness in the international community to attempt to pursue justice in cases of violations of human rights conventions and other atrocities committed in the context of conflict. In this article we investigated the psychological processes that underlie the perception of the events, and particularly of the victims, by individuals who share a social identity with the perpetrators, and how these processes affect the pursuit of both retributive and restorative justice. Specifically, we expected that individuals would respond differently to atrocities committed by the ingroup as compared to an outgroup and that the extent to which they glorify the ingroup in the first place would moderate such an effect. Furthermore, we proposed that justice demanded in the case of atrocities committed by the ingroup would be mediated by moral disengagement strategies.

Three studies, two conducted in the United States and one in the United Kingdom, provided support to our hypotheses, showing that high glorification predicts a lesser desire to reestablish justice and that the moral disengagement strategies of dehumanization and minimization of the emotional suffering of the victims mediated this effect. In the following, we comment in more detail on these findings and their implications, and outline ways in which the present research can be improved and expanded.

Glorification Versus Attachment

Building on the literature on the various forms of identification with the ingroup, and particularly the work by Roccas et al. (2006), we hypothesized and found that glorification should lead to greater use of moral disengagement strategies and, in turn, to a lesser desire to reestablish justice, when individuals are confronted with an ingroup-committed atrocity. Importantly, as opposed to glorification, attachment did not lead to any of these effects. If anything, attachment seemed to predict these variables in the opposite direction—a trend consistent with findings by Roccas et al.

The role of glorification in blocking support for the pursuit of justice has important consequences for social psychological theory and application. Social identity theorists have long discussed the relation between strength of identification with the ingroup and negative biases, such as outgroup derogation. Brewer (2001), for instance, argues that ingroup love (attachment) does not necessarily translate into outgroup hate. In the context of the present studies, it seems that attachment does not necessarily translate into reduced calls for justice for ingroup misdeeds.

This separation of glorification and attachment is in some ways reassuring, because attachment to the ingroup appears to be a fundamental psychological need of the individual (Castano, 2004; Castano & Dechesne, 2005; Reid & Hogg, 2005), and it is thus not something that we can hope to easily dispense with, or even significantly diminish. Fortunately, our findings do not indicate a need to reduce attachment. Although we know little about the genesis of glorifying tendencies, such tendencies may not reflect a necessary psychological need but rather an aspect of identification that is fueled by political rhetoric (Castano, 2008). If this is indeed the case, it is possible that the tendency to glorify the ingroup might be tamed without denying the individual a group identity altogether.

Another aspect of our glorification-related findings deserves comment. The previously described effect of glorification emerged even after controlling for SDO (Study 2) and a relevant aspect of RWA (Study 3). Although the glorification scale bears resemblance to aspects of both SDO and RWA, it also has clear, idiosyncratic dimensions that set it apart from both of these concepts. Glorification focuses on perceived power and morality of the ingroup, in a comparative manner, and emphasizes loyalty and obedience to the ingroup. It would seem that glorification plays a role similar to nationalism (as opposed to patriotism; Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989), which has been shown to moderate the positive relation between need for...
closure and support for military action against Iraq (Federico, Golec, & Dial, 2005). The advantage of the glorification scale, however, is its generalizability. Unlike nationalism, which is confined to national groups, glorification is applicable to any social group, for example, religious groups, cultural groups, or political parties.

The Role of Moral Disengagement Strategies

A central goal of the present contribution was to assess the mediating role of moral disengagement strategies in the relation between glorification and justice. Based on the social psychological literature, we predicted and found that although individuals engage in moral disengagement strategies to a similar extent when confronted with outgroup- versus ingroup-committed atrocities, only in the ingroup-perpetrator condition do these strategies mediate the effect of glorification on justice. This result is, in our view, noteworthy. It has long been argued that moral disengagement strategies are “for doing” (Bar-Tal, 1990; Kelman, 1973; Oplotow, 1990; Staub, 1987, 1990), but no clear empirical evidence of such a link has been provided. The present data thus demonstrate that moral disengagement strategies do not just reflect inconsequential beliefs about the outgroup. Rather, they are psychological mechanisms that are strategically used to morally disengage from past ingroup violence, and their use has detrimental consequences for behavioral intentions such as justice demands, in terms of punishment for ingroup perpetrators and compensation of the outgroup victims.

Moreover, moral disengagement likely helps maintain system justification beliefs (Jost & Banaji, 1994; Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004) that are threatened by the unjust behavior of the ingroup. Our focus was on glorification, and thus we tested more closely other individual-difference variables such as SDO and RWA, as opposed to system-justifying tendencies. There is recent evidence, however, that endorsements of system-justifying ideology negatively affect emotional distress and intentions to help the disadvantaged (Waksal, Jost, Tyler, & Chen, 2007). Future research in which the moderating role of (ingroup) responsibility for the distress and disadvantage of others would provide a bridge between these and our own findings.

In the studies presented here, we considered two moral disengagement strategies: dehumanization and minimization of the emotional suffering of the victims. Dehumanization is a well-documented phenomenon (Castano & Kofta, 2009; Haslam, 2006) that previous research has investigated in the context of moral disengagement (Castano & Giner-Sorolla, 2006; Cehajic, Brown, & Gonzalez, 2009). The minimization of the emotional suffering of victims has not been thoroughly investigated, but it is clearly connected to different lines of social psychological research.

A number of studies have established that empathy for outgroup suffering is lower than for ingroup suffering and that dehumanization plays a part in this effect (Cehajic, Brown, & Castano, 2008; Cuddy, Rock, & Norton, 2007; DeLuca-McLean & Castano, 2009). In our view, however, the minimization mechanism is an even more radical step than nonempathic reactions. Instead of not feeling a victim’s pain, minimizing reflects a denial of emotional sensitivity to the victim. This minimization may be morally disengaging in two ways. It implicitly suggests that the actions were not as horrible as they may appear and that the victims do not have the capacity for suffering at a deep level, possibly because they are incapable of emotionality. The latter may be akin to a mechanistic dehumanization (Haslam, 2006). In its former meaning, minimization is ultimately an ingroup-centered moral disengagement strategy, whereas in the latter meaning it is outgroup centered; it helps remove victims from the sphere of humanity and thus from the scope of justice.

Although moral disengagement strategies can have negative consequences for intergroup relations and justice, they may also lead to positive outcomes for the individual using them, notably by protecting the psychological equanimity and identity of the individual in the presence of threatening information (Bandura, 1999). Moral disengagement in this way might resemble the analysis of certain collective rituals (e.g., mourning rituals, funeral rites) as proposed by Durkheim (1912). In Durkheim’s model, the rituals enhance negative emotions at the individual level but lead to an increase in the cohesion of the group, and thus they are valued from a societal standpoint. In the case of moral disengagement as investigated here, the opposite may be happening: The individual uses such strategies to avoid negative emotionality, but the strategies have negative consequences at the societal level because they are detrimental to intergroup relations. It should be noted, however, that if the system of reference is restricted to the ingroup, then moral disengagement may actually have a positive impact at the collective level as well. Denigration of others may lead to ingroup cohesion, and for the group, shielding its members from punishment can appear to be beneficial for them, at least temporarily. For those who truly wish to treat all humans as having equal rights across national boundaries, however, moral disengagement is unequivocally something that stands in the way of justice.

Authors’ Note

Study 3 was conducted as the third author’s master’s thesis.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

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Notes

1. We also tested the model via separate single-mediator analyses via bootstrapping for minimization and dehumanization; each of these analyses showed a significant indirect effect. Furthermore, we tested the multiple mediation model via path analysis, which yielded a good fit, $\chi^2(4, 141) = 5.57, p > .10; \chi^2/df = 1.39$, root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) = .05, comparative fit index (CFI) = .99, nonnormed fit index (NNFI) = .98. An alternative model in which the moral disengagement strategies were the outcome variables and justice and the mediator fit very poorly, $\chi^2(5, 141) = 57.33, p < .001; \chi^2/df = 11.47$, RMSEA = .27, CFI = .76, NNFI = .51, strengthening the validity of our model.

2. We also tested the model via separate simple mediation analyses via bootstrapping for each mediator separately, which showed significant indirect paths involving each mediator. Furthermore, we tested the multiple mediation model via path analysis, which yielded a good fit, $\chi^2(4, 74) = 5.11, p < .05; \chi^2/df = 1.28$, RMSEA = .06, CFI = .99, NNFI = .98. An alternative model in which the moral disengagement strategies were the outcome variables and justice and the mediator fit very poorly, $\chi^2(5, 141) = 20.35, p < .001; \chi^2/df = 4.07$, RMSEA = .21, CFI = .86, NNFI = .73, strengthening the validity of our model.

3. As in Studies 1 and 2, single-mediator analyses for minimization and dehumanization via bootstrapping each showed a significant indirect effect. In path analysis, although the initial model from Study 2 showed poor global fit, $\chi^2(5, 121) = 14.16, p < .05; \chi^2/df = 2.69$, RMSEA = .12, CFI = .94, NNFI = .83, inspection of a nearly fully saturated model omitting only the dehumanization-minimization path showed a significant negative path between attachment and emotional minimization (consistent with the notion that attachment and glorification have different effects, high attachment predicted lower emotional minimization). The model including this path showed a close to perfect global fit, $\chi^2(4, 121) = 4.05, p < .10; \chi^2/df = 1.01$, RMSEA = .01, CFI = 1.00, NNFI = 1.00. As in Studies 1 and 2, an alternative model reversing the mediator status of justice and moral disengagement strategies had a very poor fit, $\chi^2(5, 121) = 16.42, p < .01; \chi^2/df = 3.28$, RMSEA = .14, CFI = .92, NNFI = .76.

References


